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CONTENTS
• The currency crises in Southeast Asia have once again exemplified the risks of integrating emerging market econo-
mies into international capital markets. Hence, proposals to throw "sand in the wheels" of international capital markets
by taxing or otherwise restricting capital flows have re-entered policy discussions. The transition economies of
Central and Eastern Europe are a group of countries for which potential policy lessons seem particularly urgent. The
more advanced transition economies have imported substantial amounts of foreign capital in recent years, and
longer-term foreign direct investment has accounted only for about one-third of these inflows.
• Essentially, the case for taxing cross-border capital flows is based on the notion that financial markets react faster
than goods markets. This market imperfection may cause fluctuations in the real economy which are not linked to
fundamentals. Hence, a corrective tax or other restrictions on short-term capital flows may enhance welfare if certain
assumptions are met.
• However, taxes on cross-border capital flows face substantial enforcement problems. In order to prevent tax evasion,
the tax would have to be levied on a broad base. The experience of Chile with reserve requirements on capital in-
flows suggests that tax evasion may increase over time, hence progressively eroding the effectiveness of the tax.
Moreover, since the tax would have to be introduced unilaterally in the transition, also desirable capital inflows would
be diverted to third countries.
• Quite apart from enforcement problems, it is not clear whether taxes on cross-border capital flows reduce volatility in
financial markets. The introduction of the tax by itself leads to an overshooting of the exchange rate. If the tax had to
be abolished again in the future, such an overshooting would take place even twice. In addition, there is no clear-cut
evidence as to which type of capital flows are the most volatile and how volatility of capital flows and of exchange
rates changes after the imposition of capital controls.
• There is ample evidence that sticking to fixed exchange rates which are inconsistent with domestic fundamentals
increases the risk of a crisis. This risk is particularly pronounced if weak macroeconomic fundamentals coincide with
weak institutions and incentive systems on a microlevel. Taxes on short-term capital flows do not solve the problem
of the induced exchange rate misalignment but may rather delay adjustment efforts. Conversely, structural reforms at
the domestic level can reduce the exposure of the transition economies to volatile capital flows.
• Perhaps the most important policy implication is the crucial need to disseminate transparent, timely, and reliable infor-
mation to the international investment community in order to reduce the amount of noise trading in financial markets.
Because commercial banks are the key link between domestic and international financial markets, the enforcement of
prudential regulations against excessive foreign borrowing of banks, as enshrined in the guidelines of the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements in Basle, should be the focus of policymakers.
• The transition economies also have to take into account that the membership in the OECD and the envisaged mem-
bership in the European Union restrain their policy options. Incidentally, the conditions of EU membership by them-
selves can reduce the exposure of the new members to adverse external shocks by enhancing macroeconomic sta-
bility and by strengthening institutions.
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The currency crises that have hit Southeast Asia
in the past months have once again exemplified
the potential risks of integrating emerging mar-
ket economies into international capital mar-
kets.
1 Although the countries had long been
praised for their strong reliance on long-term
foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance cur-
rent account imbalances, they have yet turned
out to be vulnerable to reversals of short-term
capital flows just as many other developing
countries, notably in Latin America, before.
2 If
short-term capital flows (suddenly) reverse,
countries are forced into severe adjustment
crises because flows of goods and services tend
to react less quickly. Hence, limiting inflows of
(short-term) capital by imposing taxes has
entered policy discussions once again as an
option to limit the exposure to volatile capital
flows. A tax on short-term capital inflows has
particular appeal.
3
The transition economies of Central and East-
ern Europe are a group of countries for which
potential policy lessons seem particularly ur-
gent. The more advanced reform countries such
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Estonia have temporarily imported capital by
the amount of more than 10 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in the past couple of
years. While foreign direct investment has been
important for these economies, portfolio invest-
ment and other short-term capital flows have in-
creased as well recently. Sustainable current ac-
count positions have, thus, become a major pol-
icy issue for the reform countries (EBRD 1998;
Fries et al. 1998), and taxes on short-term capi-
tal flows are among the policy options being
discussed. The Polish Finance Minister, for ex-
ample, has recently indicated that he is con-
sidering measures to control short-term capital
flows.
4
Yet, the maintenance or imposition of restric-
tions on capital account transactions may not
seem warranted in view of the envisaged mem-
bership in the European Union of these econ-
omies and of the commitments towards capital
account convertibility made under membership
in the OECD. However, as taxes on short-term
capital flows are also being discussed in the
West,
5 it is probable that the European Union
(EU) would consent at least to the maintenance
of temporary controls for the new members.
This paper discusses whether the implemen-
tation of a tax on short-term capital flows can
make the transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe less vulnerable to adverse ex-
ternal shocks and to sudden withdrawals of for-
eign capital. The following section outlines the
main arguments which are advanced by the sup-
porters and opponents of a transactions tax on
foreign capital flows. We also develop a simple
theoretical framework which allows us to study
the effects of a tax on capital inflows. The
model reveals that it is important to distinguish
between two effects of a transactions tax. On
the one hand, a transactions tax might be a use-
ful tool to discourage destabilizing trading stra-
tegies on the foreign exchange market. On the
other hand, it should be taken into account that
a tax on foreign capital flows pushes the econ-
omy to a new steady state. This induces an
overshooting of the exchange rate if "super ef-
ficient" financial markets react faster than goods
markets. Thus, the implementation of a transac-
tions tax by itself can be viewed as a source of
additional (excess) volatility of the exchange
rate. Section 3 briefly discusses the experience
of Chile which maintains a deposit requirement
for short-term capital inflows. Section 4 gives
an account of the structure of capital flows of
the transition economies and of the restrictions
which currently pertain to the capital account of
the balance of payments. We restrict our anal-
ysis to four of the more advanced reform coun-
tries — i.e., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, and Poland — because the policy issues
of high capital inflows are most relevant for
these countries. Section 5 concludes.2. Is There a Case for Capital Controls?
Before discussing the pro's and con's of the
taxation of capital flows, it is useful to clarify a
few concepts. First, a distinction needs to be
made between exchange rate volatility and ex-
change rate misalignment. While the former im-
plies exchange rate movements around a trend,
the latter implies a movement of the exchange
rate away from its fundamental value. Volatility
may be very low in this case. While taxes on
short-term capital address the former, they are
unable (and not intended) to deal with the lat-
ter.6 Second, we are concerned with real rather
than nominal exchange rates. Ultimately, the
level of the real exchange rate is determined by
economic fundamentals such as differences be-
tween countries in productivity and in prefer-
ences. Because a high volatility of the real ex-
change rate is unlikely to be a mere reflection
of changes in underlying fundamentals, it may,




In his original proposal Tobin advocates throw-
ing "some sand in the wheels of excessively ef-
ficient international money markets" by means
of an "internationally uniform tax on all spot
conversions of one currency into another"
(Tobin 1978: 154-155). The Tobin tax, thus,
covers all foreign exchange transactions and all
traders. It is collected by the national tax auth-
orities at a low tax rate which is invariant to the
interest rate. Implementation must be world-
wide, and the main intention of the tax is to re-
duce real exchange rate volatility.
8
During the past two decades of academic dis-
cussion, alternative variants have been dis-
cussed. Eichengreen et al. (1995: 166), for ex-
ample, propose a "tax or deposit requirement to
all domestic-currency lending to nonresidents
[...] regardless of the market in which they are
booked." While it does not become entirely
clear why this tax would apply to nonresidents
only, it is intended to prevent speculation
against EU currencies prior to the introduction
of the euro. The main intention of this tax is to
protect the domestic balance of payments. It
would, thus, be levied at a relatively high rate
and would rise with the domestic interest rate,
i.e., with the opportunity cost of the reserve re-
quirement. Implementation would be on a na-
tional level.
Garber and Taylor (1995) discuss zero-in-
terest margin deposits or prudential bank capital
requirements against net foreign exchange pos-
itions as two additional options. Both restric-
tions would raise the effective costs of foreign
loans and, thus, make borrowing from abroad
less attractive. In the following, we mainly re-
strict ourselves to these modified proposals, i.e.,
on proposals to introduce taxes or other restric-
tions on (short-term) capital inflows.
2.2. Volatility and the Real Sector
The basic intuition behind Tobin's proposal is
the notion that "super efficient" financial mar-
kets react faster than goods markets. Moreover,
the underlying assumption is that the interaction
of traders on financial markets gives rise to
herding behavior and noise trading. This, in
turn, drives a wedge between the price of a fi-
nancial instrument and its fundamental value
and, thus, causes excessive volatility in the
price of financial variables. The fast and sudden
changes in financial markets are in contrast to
delayed responses of the real sector. This might
be sub-optimal because physical investment and
exports may be reduced, resources may be mis-
allocated, and overall growth and welfare may
suffer. The proposal to establish a transactions
tax is, thus, based on a second-best framework.
A delayed response of the real sector can be
modeled in a variety of ways. A classical frame-
work which allows to model sluggish adjust-
ment of the real sector of an open economy to
exogenous shocks is the sticky-price model de-
veloped by Dornbusch (1976). We now employ
this setup to shed light on the implications ofthe introduction of a transactions tax on the dy-
namics of this model as well as on the equilib-
rium exchange rate and price level. We extend
the Dornbusch model in two regards. First, we
incorporate a transactions cost parameter which
captures the impact of a tax on capital inflows
the economic system.
9 Second, we modify the
basic version by allowing for the presence of
technical traders (chartists) on the foreign ex-
change market because one argument in favor
of a transactions tax is that it might be capable
of reducing the volatility of the exchange rate
by discouraging nonfundamental trading strate-
gies on the foreign exchange market. Our speci-
fication of the sticky-price model can be viewed
as a simplified version of the framework con-
structed by DeGrauwe (1992) to study determi-
nistic chaotic dynamics on the foreign exchange
market. Box 1 summarizes the main features of
the model.
The magnitude of the transactions tax para-
meter alters both the dynamics of the model out-
side the steady state and the coordinates charac-
terizing the steady state (point A in Figure la)
of the system.
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0 The dynamic behavior of the
system is shown in Figure la. The schedule PP
represents all combinations of the exchange rate
and the price level in the (e, p) plane for which
Box 1 - Crowding Out the Crowd: The Formal Model
[1] dp = <t>(y-y)dt price adjustment,
[2] y = <5(e - p) output demand,
[3] m - p = *y - Xr money market,
[4] E(de)-(r-T-r*)dt , 0<T<1 currency arbitrage,
where E = expectations operator, * = foreign variable. Equation [1] states that any deviation of domestic
aggregate demand y from the natural output y induces a sluggish adjustment of the domestic price level.
Aggregate demand [2] is an increasing function of the real exchange rate e - p . The nominal exchange rate e is
defined as the domestic currency price of the foreign currency. Money demand depends on natural output and
the domestic instantaneous interest rate r. Equation [4] is a modified version of the uncovered interest rate
parity. Any differential between the domestic and the foreign instantaneous interest rate r* has to be covered by
corresponding exchange rate expectations. This fundamental relation holds in the present framework, too.
However, we assume that domestic authorities have already implemented a transactions tax t on capital
inflows which reduces the interest earnings from holding domestic assets. For simplification, we ignore the use
of the proceeds of the tax. The adjusted or net interest rate differential is compensated through corresponding
exchange rate expectations E which are a weighted average of the expectations of two types of market
participants (Frankel and Froot 1990; DeGrauwe 1992):
[5] E(de) = wE(de) + (1 - w)a{\ - r)(e - e)dt exchange rate expectations,
with 0 < w < 1. The term a(e -e) represents the extrapolative exchange rate expectations of market participants
which behave like technical traders. A current deviation of the exchange rate from the long-run equilibrium
level e induces these chartists to believe that this gap will become even larger in the next instant of time. The
second type of traders are the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists are assumed to know the structural
equations of the model and are aware of the presence of the chartists. Thus, fundamentalists are able to form
exchange rate expectations taking into account both the dynamics of the macroeconomic framework as well as
the impact of technical traders on the time path of the exchange rate. The exchange rate expectations of
fundamentalists are model-consistent and can, thus, be employed to trace out the dynamics of the exchange
rate: E(de) / dt = de I dt. Finally, we follow the literature in assuming that the relative importance of technical
traders on the foreign exchange market depends on the magnitude of the transactions tax (Frankel 1996). We
capture this by introducing a second multiplicative term 0 < (1 - r) < 1 into the elasticity a of the exchange rate
expectations of technical traders with respect to the deviation of the exchange rate from the steady-state level.Figure 1 - The Dynamics of the Model and the Impact of a Transactions Tax
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Figure 1a
aggregate demand equals the natural output and
for which, thus, the rate of change of the price
level is zero. For points above (below) this line,
the inflation rate is positive (negative) due to
the expenditure-switching effect caused by a
real depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic
currency which induces aggregate demand to
exceed (to fall below) the natural output level.
The FF line visualizes all combinations of the
exchange rate and the price level in the (e, p)
plane which imply stationarity of the exchange
rate. Points to the right (left) of the FF schedule
indicate that the interest rate differential out-
matches (understates) the exchange rate expec-
tations of the chartists, requiring a depreciation
(an appreciation) of the domestic currency. The
stable trajectory of the system is denoted as ST
in Figure 1.
Figure lb illustrates the various effects which
take place in the aftermath of a (nonanticipated)
change of the transactions tax parameter T. The
FF schedule becomes steeper and shifts to the
right. The introduction of the transactions tax
results in an instantaneous depreciation of the
domestic currency. The nominal exchange rate
overshoots the new long-run equilibrium level
as the currency arbitrage condition given in
equation [4] stipulates that the negative (net)
interest rate differential caused by the nonanti-
cipated implementation of the tax has to be
covered by corresponding appreciation expecta-
PP
Figure 1b
dons for the domestic currency. The overshoot-
ing of the nominal exchange rate, however, is
reduced as the transactions tax increases the
slope of the stable trajectory. This effect reflects
our assumption that a transactions tax dampens
the influence of technical traders on the foreign
exchange market. Nevertheless, the domestic
currency faces a temporary real devaluation and
this causes an increase of the domestic inflation
rate. As the economy slides along the stable tra-
jectory in the direction of the new steady state,
the excess demand on the commodity market is
dampened by the increase in the price level as
well as the concomitant appreciation of the do-
mestic currency. Finally, the economy reaches a
new steady state (point B in Figure lb) which is




Note that the increased slope of the saddle-
path of the system due to the transactions tax
reduces the overshooting of the nominal (and
real) exchange rate which ensues from domestic
money supply shocks. Thus, our simple model
also serves to formalize the argument that a
transactions tax can help to expand the auton-
omy of national monetary policy.
In summary, a transactions tax on capital in-
flows is capable of reducing the amplitude of
exchange rate fluctuations by increasing the
slope of the trajectory of the system. There is,
however, no free lunch. Policymakers shouldtake into account that the implementation of a
transactions tax by itself is an exogenous shock
which pushes the economy to a new steady-
state equilibrium. The new steady state is char-
acterized by a depreciated domestic currency
and a higher domestic price level. Moreover,
sluggish price adjustment on the commodity
market causes a temporary overshooting of the
exchange rate relative to the new long-run equi-
librium level. The implementation of a transac-
tions tax on cross-border capital flows, thus, by
itself induces additional fluctuations of the ex-
change rate.
2.3. Does a Transactions Tax Reduce
Volatility?
The welfare-enhancing effect of a transactions
tax depends upon the assumption that the tax
reduces the volatility of exchange rates. Indeed,
the idea is to introduce a uniform tax rate on all
foreign capital flows. This implies that short-
term investment would be much more dis-
couraged than long-term investment. Short-term
oriented investment strategies, in turn, are as-
sumed to raise the volatility of the exchange
rate. Thus, it is implicitly presupposed that mar-
ket participants which pursue destabilizing trad-
ing strategies and which rely on noisy signals
have a shorter time horizon than sophisticated
investors. The latter would come up with the
decision to invest only after assessing the fun-
damental value of a financial instrument.
DeLong et al. (1990) have formally demon-
strated that the presence of noise traders causes
a significant deviation of the price of a financial
variable from its fundamental value only if the
time horizon of sophisticated investors is shor-
ter than the time horizon of noise traders. In
such a situation, the market risk generated by
the presence of noise traders prevents sophisti-
cated investors from pursuing arbitrage strate-
gies which would eliminate the gap between the
price of a financial instrument and its funda-
mental value. This argument reveals that the op-
timality of transactions tax critically depends
upon the time horizon of the various groups of
market participants on the foreign exchange
market.
Even if the time horizon of noise traders is
relatively long compared to the time horizon of
sophisticated traders, the notion that a transac-
tions tax dampens market volatility is not clear.
Rather, the capability of a transactions tax to re-
duce the volatility of the prices of financial in-
struments can be questioned for three additional
reasons. First, it is most unlikely that a small
transactions tax eliminates the huge profits
sometimes generated as the result of successful
speculation. Second, a transactions tax might
reduce the liquidity of the market for the instru-
ment which is subject to the tax. This, in turn,
would imply that compared to a situation with-
out a transactions tax even relatively small exo-
genous shocks could entail large movements of
the price of the financial instrument. And, third,
a transactions tax might induce only a shift of
volatility. The financial instrument which is
subject to the transactions tax would be traded
less frequently. Optimizing agents would try to
evade paying the tax by investing in other fi-
nancial instruments or by generating the payoff
of the taxed instrument synthetically by means
of financial derivatives.
1
2 This, of course, might
pave the way for the implementation of trans-
actions taxes on these alternative financial in-
struments.
From an empirical point of view, the ques-
tion whether a transactions tax reduces volatil-
ity is rather difficult to answer. Since taxes on
foreign exchange transactions have hardly been
implemented, direct empirical evidence is not
available. Some indirect evidence can be gauged
from countries such as Chile which have im-
posed restrictions on certain types of capital in-
flows (see Section 3 below). Indirect evidence
could also be obtained from transactions taxes
that have been introduced into other markets.
Campbell and Froot (1994), for example review
the experience with transactions taxes in securi-
ties markets. They find that the implementation
of transactions taxes leads to a reduction in
overall trading and to a migration of trades to
unregulated markets. Other studies suggest that
trading volume and volatility are positively re-
lated (Stulz 1994: 305). Yet, because the micro-structures of securities and foreign exchange
markets differ quite considerably and because
behavioral changes induced by the introduction
of taxes are not accounted for in these studies,
no strong inference can be drawn.
2.4. Can the Tax Be Implemented?
Apart from the issue whether a tax on capital
flows would be desirable, there is the question
of how difficult it would be to implement such
a tax. There are two aspects here. One is wheth-
er the tax could be agreed upon, and enforced
on the broad international scale envisaged by its
proponents. We are skeptical. Given this skepti-
cism, one can ask what effects a unilateral im-
position of capital controls might have, particu-
larly from the point of view of transition econ-
omies, which are our main focus here.
A transactions tax would ideally be imposed
globally because the imposition only in one
country would be expected to essentially drive
foreign exchange trading offshore (Frankel
1996). The tax would only become binding if
the imposition of such a policy instrument was
the outcome of an international agreement. To
the present day, such an agreement has not been
achieved, and the degree of policy coordination
necessary to carry out such a plan will likely
prevent it from being realized in the near future.
Even if an international agreement on trans-
actions taxes could be established, it is an open
question whether this global coordination of eco-
nomic policy results in a stable equilibrium.
1
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The problem of stability arises because, like in
any cartel, individual countries might be tempted
to undercut the agreed tax rate to increase their
volume of onshore trading. Such a disregard of
the international agreement could be expected
to provoke a response of other countries. As a
consequence, the whole international system of
transactions taxes could break down.
Given these obstacles to a global tax on capi-
tal flows, the only option currently open to tran-
sition economies would be a unilateral tax. In
this case though, any potential benefits in terms
of reduced volatility would have to be weighed
against a possible loss in attractiveness for for-
eign investors relative to other emerging mar-
kets which do not impose such taxes. But apart
from this, making the tax stick would require
that the tax be levied on as broad a base as pos-
sible inclusive of transactions relating to trade
in goods and services. Otherwise, optimizing
economic agents could avoid paying the tax by
carrying out transactions in financial instru-
ments which are not subject to the tax. For ex-
ample, agents might prefer to circumvent a tax
by generating cash flows synthetically by utiliz-
ing, e.g., financial derivatives. Administering a
tax with such a wide scope might overstretch
the administrative capacities especially of less
advanced transition economies. This is true all
the more since the tax would have to be im-
posed unilaterally so that there would be limited
scope for cooperation with other countries in
keeping track of transactions for tax purposes.
On balance, therefore, there are formidable ob-
stacles to a successful implementation of a
transactions tax in transition economies.
2.5. Do Capital Controls Send the
Right Signal?
Capital controls by definition impede the free
flow of capital. If we take for granted that a
worldwide implementation of a tax on foreign
exchange transactions is hardly feasible, a coun-
try which decides to levy such a tax on capital
flows ceteris paribus takes a relatively more in-
terventionist stance than other countries. Even
if such controls are justified in a second-best
framework, they might in principle be used to
serve other political goals as well. If foreign
investors are incompletely informed about the
actual intentions of a government, the introduc-
tion of capital controls might, thus, send nega-
tive signals. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) have
formalized this argument. They show that capi-
tal controls can have negative effects on total
investment because they send negative signals
about future policies to investors. Their result
hinges upon the assumption that information
about the type of a government is asymmetri-
cally distributed between investors and govern-
ments. Governments can raise revenue by tax-ing the capital stock in their country, and they
differ with respect to the alternative sources of
income to which they have access. In this model,
the imposition of capital controls sends a nega-
tive signal to investors that governments lack al-
ternative sources of income and are, thus, likely
to impose controls in the future. Conversely,
abolishing controls on capital outflows sends a




If uncertainty about the course of domestic
policies prevails and if investment projects are
irreversible, investors are also induced to post-
pone investment.
1
5 This has implications for
the volume and structure of capital inflows as
well as for the sequencing of capital account
liberalization. Generally, in the presence of un-
certainty, capital inflows will be biased towards
relatively liquid, short-term investments (Buch,
Heinrich, and Pierdzioch 1998). Laban and
Larrain (1997) have also taken issue with the
common practice to be more liberal with the lib-
eralization of capital inflows rather than out-
flows. They show that a relaxation of controls
on capital outflows, aimed at reducing the scope
for a real appreciation of the domestic currency,
may actually increase net capital inflows rather
than lowering them. In the presence of capital
controls, the option to defer the investment de-
cision has a positive value to investors. This op-
tion value of waiting is positive if uncertainty
about the future prevails, if the current invest-
ment opportunity is available also in future
periods, and if capital controls make investment
irreversible. Conversely, policy measures that
reduce the option value and, thus, increase in-
vestment are those which either reduce the irre-
versibility of investment (for example, by lower-
ing controls on capital outflows) or reduce un-
certainty about future investment conditions.
While Laban and Larrain (1997) emphasize
that capital controls increase the irreversibility
of international investments and, thus, enhance
the option value of waiting, Tornell (1990)
argues that a transactions tax is capable of re-
ducing the volatility of financial variables and
that it is therefore a proper instrument to elimi-
nate the "irreversibility distortion." In his model,
the Tobin tax is utilized as an instrument to
shield a small open economy from "rumors"
which are modeled as the realizations of a con-
tinuously evolving stochastic process. A trans-
actions tax reduces the volatility of the domes-
tic real interest rate and this, in turn, reduces the
option value of realizing debt-financed irrever-
sible investment projects. The optimality of a
transactions tax, however, crucially hinges upon
two assumptions. First, policymakers must be
able to disentangle movements of financial vari-
ables which reflect changes of fundamentals
from movements which are merely attributable
to rumors or to noise. And, second, while the
empirical evidence indicates that investment de-
cisions of firms are indeed sensitive to un-
certainty and irreversibility,
1
6 it is open to dis-
cussion whether a transactions tax can actually
serve to reduce the volatility of asset prices.
3. What Are the Lessons from Chile?
Chile is typically being cited as one of the
prime examples for the effectiveness of Tobin-
type capital controls. Yet, the restrictions that
Chile has imposed on capital inflows are non-
uniform and would, thus, not qualify as pure
Tobin taxes.
1
7 Since 1991, foreign loans and
deposits by nonresidents in Chile have general-
ly been subject to a 20 percent nonremunerated
reserve requirement. The reserve requirement
rate was raised to 30 percent in May 1992, and
the deposit period was then fixed to one year.
Also, a 1.2 percent stamp tax on local currency
credits was at that time extended to foreign
loans as well, excluding trade credits.
At first sight, the reserve requirements were a
success: While in the short run restricted short-
term capital was substituted by nonrestricted
capital, the overall volume of short-term capital
inflows was reduced in the longer term (Laban
et al. 1997). Hence, Laban et al. (1997: 21) con-10
elude that "the case for the ineffectiveness of
capital controls may have been overstated."
Yet, there are three observations which cast
shadows on the Chilean experience.
First, there was a relatively strong increase in
the standard deviation of capital inflows subject
to controls after the controls had been intro-
duced. In the four years prior to the introduc-
tion of the controls, the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation/mean) was 1.52, and it in-
creased to 4.22 in the four subsequent years.
1
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This contributed to the increase in the overall
coefficient of variation of short-term capital
flows from 0.77 to 1.00 as noncontrolled short-
term capital flows were much less volatile
throughout (0.91 and 1.00, respectively). Mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation, long-term
capital inflows were more volatile than short-
term flows throughout but were determined in
any case by different factors than short-term
capital flows.
Second, because markets found ways to cir-
cumvent the reserve requirements, the Chilean
authorities successively had to expand the cov-
erage of the controls (Laban and Larrain 1998).
In 1995, the deposit requirement was extended
to other financial investments, excluding FDI
and first issues of American Depository Re-
ceipts (ADRs). In 1996, reserve requirements
were extended to credits after their first roll-
over. Also, the maximum proportion of foreign
investment projects that can be financed through
debt was lowered from 70 to 50 percent, and
the minimum amount of foreign direct invest-
ment exempted from the reserve requirement
was raised. These adjustments became neces-
sary because trades migrated to less regulated
markets. The interesting point may be that ex-
tended coverage of the controls appears to have
become necessary only after a relatively long
time.
Third, Chile's currency has come under pres-
sure recently as a result of the Asian crises to
which Chile is heavily exposed due to its large
exports to that region. In response, the govern-
ment has now reduced from 30 to 10 percent
the mandatory noninterest-bearing deposit it
had imposed on short-term capital inflows in
1991. The intention is to attract more capital in
order to support the currency and to prevent a
further devaluation which would hurt firms with
open foreign exchange liabilities (Banco Cen-
tral de Chile 1998). Thus, precisely at a time
when currency turmoil elsewhere would sug-
gest that a transactions tax would prove partic-
ularly useful, the Chilean authorities are ap-
parently concluding that, whatever the benefits
of the tax, they can no longer afford to turn
away foreign capital.
This may have to do with the fact that there
is no evidence that the introduction of controls
on short-term capital flows has had an immedi-
ate restraining impact on real exchange rate vola-
tility. After a prolonged period of real deprecia-
tion, the Chilean peso has appreciated consider-
ably in real terms since 1991. Real exchange
rate volatility as measured by historical coef-
ficients of variation has come down significant-
ly since the debt crises of the early 1980s, al-
though it remains clearly higher than for in-
stance in Germany (Figure 2a). Consistently with
our model above, volatility actually rose in
1991 and 1992 when the controls were first in-
troduced. It also rose in both 1995 and 1997
during the Mexican and Asian crises. However,
it should be noted that these movements in
volatility were relatively minor. Moreover, the
reserve requirement on short-term capital in-
flows was adopted immediately after the cur-
rency crisis in neighboring Argentina in 1989-
90. As Figure 2b demonstrates, real exchange
rate volatility in Argentina increased dramati-
cally during that period. So we cannot rule out
that the introduction of reserve requirements in
Chile, while not reducing volatility, at least pre-
vented it from increasing in the wake of the
crisis in Argentina. Similarly, Mexico experi-
enced a marked increase in real exchange rate
volatility during its balance of payments crisis
in late 1994 and early 1995 (Figure 2c), with
only minor consequences for volatility in Chile.
Again, this might conceivably have been due to
Chile's reserve requirements on short-term in-
flows. Nonetheless, the relative immunity of the
Chilean currency to crises in Argentina,
Mexico, and Asia may have more to do with the
underlying strength of the Chilean economy
and the depth of its structural reforms in the
1980s than with capital controls (Laban and
Larrain 1998; Sachs et al. 1996).11
Figure 2a - Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Chile and Germany, 1981-1998
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Note: Standard deviation of percentage change in real effective exchange rate over the previous 12 months, based on
relative consumer prices.
Source: IMF (1998c); own calculations.
Figure 2b - Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Argentina, 1981-1998
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Note: Standard deviation of percentage change in real exchange rate over the previous 12 months, based on consumer
prices relative to the US dollar.
Source: IMF (1998c); own calculations.12
Figure 2c - Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Mexico, 1981-1998
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Note: Standard deviation of percentage change in real exchange rate over the previous 12 months, based on relative
consumer prices relative to the US dollar.
Source: IMF (1998c); own calculations.
4. Where Do the Transition Economies Stand?
During the past couple of years, the more ad-
vanced transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe have attracted quite sizable capi-
tal inflows. Although gross inflows have been
small relative to global capital flows, they have
been substantial if compared to GDP, reaching
up to 10 percent of GDP in recent years (Buch
and Heinrich 1998a). Between 1989 and 1996,
about 52 percent of gross inflows into the tran-
sition economies of Central and Eastern Europe
were credits and other capital flows, followed
by FDI (32 percent), and portfolio capital (16
percent) (Table 1). In the years to come, the
share of portfolio capital is likely to increase
because the markets are still not very closely in-
tegrated with world capital markets and, thus,
offer substantial diversification gains for for-
eign investors (Buch, Heinrich, and Piazolo
1998; Linne 1998). This holds even more be-
cause EU membership will reduce institutional
barriers for foreign (EU) investors.
Table 7-Capital Flows to Eastern Europe, 1989-1996


























Source: IMF (1998a); own calculations.
4.1. Capital Account Liberalization
and Exchange Rate Policy
Capital Account Liberalization
Since the demise of the communist regime
under which the transition economies of Central
and Eastern Europe were virtually closed off13
from the (private) international capital markets,
progress in capital account liberalization has ad-
vanced quite far in the countries under re-
view.
1
9 Yet, the authorities maintain controls
on various capital account items, in particular as
regards short-term capital flows, and they limit
the amount of foreign borrowing of commercial
banks.
Estonia is the only country under review in
this paper which has fully liberalized the capital
account of its balance of payments. However, in
order to curb growth of domestic credit in re-
sponse to heavy foreign borrowing of Estonian
commercial banks in recent years, the Bank of
Estonia has gradually tightened reserve require-
ments for commercial banks. In July 1997, a 10
percent reserve requirement was imposed on the
net liabilities of Estonian commercial banks vis-
a-vis nonresidents, and the effective reserve re-
quirement was further raised (Eesti Pank 1998a).
Since July 1998, the reserve requirements have
become more restrictive because the cash com-
ponent has been raised and because financial
guarantees provided by commercial banks to
nonbank financial institutions have been in-
cluded. The Bank of Estonia intends to take
further measures if those already implemented
should not help to slow down domestic credit
growth sufficiently (Eesti Pank 1998b).
The three Visegrad countries under review
retain controls on various types of capital flows,
particularly on short-term capital flows. Gener-
ally, the Czech Republic has shown a more lib-
eral attitude with respect to short-term capital
flows than Hungary or Poland (Backe 1996).
While general prudential regulations regarding
the foreign exchange exposure of banks remain
in place, a special limit on the short-term open
foreign exchange position of commercial banks
vis-a-vis nonresidents, which had been in place
since August 1995, was abolished in October
1997 (IMF 1998d). But the Czech foreign ex-
change law contains a relative comprehensive
safeguard clause which allows the Central Bank
to impose deposit requirements on inward capi-
tal flows in times of severe balance of payments
problems and to stop certain transactions entire-
ly (CNB 1995: 27). The Central Bank did in-
struct commercial banks not to lend in koruna
to nonresidents during the May-1997 crisis, but




In the case of Poland, cross-border financial
credits to nonbanks with a maturity of less than
one year are restricted (OECD 1997: 14). This
restriction is scheduled to be abolished by
December 1999. A new foreign exchange law
which is currently under review intends to ease
access of Polish firms to foreign loans. Al-
though the option to introduce a tax on short-
term capital is not explicitly contained in the
new law, the possibility to impose reserve re-
quirements on commercial banks' foreign bor-
rowing in times of balance of payments prob-
lems has been retained.
Finally, the Hungarian foreign exchange law
foresees restrictions on short-term financial
flows (OECD 1997: 90; Elkan 1998: 94). Loans
with a maturity of less than one year, for ex-
ample, do require prior notification of and ap-
proval by the National Bank. Purchases by
Hungarian residents of securities issued by en-
terprises in OECD countries are restricted to se-
curities with a maturity of more than one year.
Exchange Rate Policies
All countries have chosen some form of fixed
exchange rate regime, ranging from the cur-
rency board in Estonia as the most restrictive
version to the strategy of dirty floating of the
Czech National Bank. Poland and Hungary lie
between these two cases as both have estab-
lished a pre-announced crawling peg.
In Estonia, domestic currency can only be is-
sued if the international reserves of the central
bank increase. This full backing of the mon-
etary base is intended to serve as a buffer
against speculation. At the same time, the high
commitment of the monetary and fiscal authori-
ties to defend the fixed parity of the Estonian
kroon to the D-mark may induce market partici-
pants to neglect potential foreign exchange
risks in their borrowing decisions and may
cause excessive domestic lending.
After pegging the exchange rate of the forint
to a basket of currencies and devaluing its value
in discrete steps, the National Bank of Hungary
moved to a pre-announced crawling peg in14
March 1995 to strike a balance between bring-
ing down domestic inflation and maintaining
competitiveness in the export sector. The
monthly devaluation was set at 1.9 percent for
the first three months that the scheme was
operative and at 1.3 percent for the following
months. As of 1997, the monthly rate of crawl
was reduced to 1.1 per month on average and
was below 1 percent in early 1998 (NBH 1998).
Similarly, the National Bank of Poland
moved from a fixed exchange rate regime to a
pre-announced crawling peg in October 1991.
While the crawling peg was mainly intended to
serve as a nominal anchor for domestic prices,
concern for the current account position prompt-
ed several discrete adjustments in the parity
through 1995. The band within which the ex-
change rate is pegged has been 7 percent on
either side since spring 1995. A further widen-
ing of the band is currently under discussion in
order to fend off speculative attacks which
might be triggered by the substantial and rising
current account deficit. Despite these concerns
about the current account position, the monthly
rate of the crawl was reduced from 1 to 0.8 per-
cent in March 1998, implying a slower real de-
preciation in the short run.
The Czech Republic devalued its nominal
rate in three steps by a total of 70 percent in
1990 and then maintained a peg to a basket of
US dollar and D-mark through spring 1997.
The band within which the peg was allowed to
fluctuate was widened from 0.5 to 7.5 percent
on either side in February 1996 in response to
large capital inflows which were swelling do-
mestic money supply and creating inflationary
pressures.
2
1 Despite the ensuing nominal appre-
ciation, expansionary wage policies and insuffi-
ciently tight fiscal policies caused a further
widening of the already large current account
deficit to eventually unsustainable levels. Politi-
cal uncertainty after inconclusive parliamentary
elections in the fall of 1996 as well as the in-
cipient crises in Southeast Asia further under-
mined the credibility of the exchange rate until
in May 1997 speculative attacks forced the
central bank to abandon the peg. Since then, the
Central Bank has followed a policy of managed
floating combined with an inflation target.
Figure 3 - Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Transition Economies, 1991-1998
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Note: Standard deviation of percentage change in real exchange rate over the previous 12 months, based on consumer
prices and the average of the exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar and the D-mark.
Source: IMF (1998c); own calculations.15
Turning to real exchange rates, the early
phase of the transformation process was charac-
terized by high volatility due to successive
rounds of nominal devaluations and price liber-
alizations. The exception is Hungary where the
initial misalignment had been less severe and
the number of centrally set prices had been
lower. Real exchange rate volatility has come
down significantly since (Figure 3). In the mid-
1990s, it was generally comparable to, for in-
stance, Chilean levels, and fell even close to
German levels in the Czech Republic. The cur-
rency crises erupting in Asia in 1997 have led
to more volatility in the transition economies as
well, particularly in Estonia and the Czech Re-
public, but again the impact has not been more
pronounced than in Chile.
2
2
4.2. Structure of Capital Flows
Table 2 presents data on the volume and volatil-
ity of capital inflows for the transition econ-
omies under review as well as for Chile. A
common time frame, ranging from the first
(second) quarter of 1993 through the latest
available observation in 1997, has been chosen.
On average, quarterly net capital inflows for
Chile and for the Czech Republic were surpris-
ingly similar. Also the coefficient of variation
was similar with "other" capital flows showing
the greatest variability. As regards gross in-
flows, however, Chile experienced greater flows
of FDI whereas in the Czech Republic other
capital inflows (mainly bank credits) domi-
nated. Interestingly, the greater variability of
these other capital flows was caused by capital
outflows rather than inflows. Gross inflows in
the category "other investments" were even less
volatile than inflows of FDI and of portfolio
capital. This suggests that the variability of
capital flows was to a large degree caused by
capital exports of residents. In fact, during
1997, (net) foreign assets of the Czech Republic
(excluding the National Bank) increased by
$ 4.4 billion while foreign liabilities rose by $
3.3 billion. Hence, the net outflow of capital in
the category "other investment" of $ 1.1 billion
was mainly caused by an increase in residents'
foreign assets.











































































































1993:1-1997:1. For Poland, consistent data (excluding information on
lows) have only been available up to the second quarter of 1995. Quarterly data
Source: IMF (1998c); unpublished data of the Czech National Bank.16
The data for Hungary are somewhat more
difficult to interpret because large net capital
outflows were booked under "other invest-
ments" as a result of the repayment of foreign
debt. Again, other capital flows and portfolio
capital flows show the greatest variance but in-
flows of FDI have been relatively volatile as
well which is to a large extent the result of FDI
in connection with the privatization process.
For Estonia, portfolio capital flows are clearly
more volatile than inflows of FDI but also than
inflows of other forms of capital.
Because comparable quarterly data for Poland
are only available through 1995, Table 3 addi-
tionally reports data on monthly net capital flows
for Hungary and Poland. Generally, FDI flows
have been less volatile than non-FDI flows. For
Hungary, again, "other investment" has been
more volatile than portfolio investment. Data
for 1989 through 1995 also show that short-term
Table 3 - Volume and Volatility of Monthly Capital

























































Coefficient of variation = standard deviation/(arithmetic) mean (in
%).
Source: Unpublished data of the National Bank of
Hungary and the National Bank of Poland; own calcula-
tions.
capital was more volatile than medium- and
long-term capital (including FDI). The data for
Poland are biased because of the repayment and
rescheduling of foreign debt that took place in
1995. Hence, long-term credits appear much
more volatile than they probably are in "nor-
mal" times. Interestingly, however, short-term
credits and other short-term capital flows do not
appear to be more volatile than portfolio invest-
ments.
Overall, there is, thus, no consistent pattern
of volatility of capital inflows — while FDI has
been relatively stable, portfolio capital and
other capital flows cannot unequivocally be
ranked by volatility. Claessens et al. (1995)
come to a similar conclusion as they find that
the classification of capital flows according to
the standard categories provides little evidence
about their actual volatility. Which type of
capital flow contributes more to instabilities in
the capital account of the balance of payments,
thus, depends to a large extent on country char-
acteristics.
Yet, the exposure of emerging markets to
sudden shifts in investor sentiment not only
depends on the historic patterns of volatility but
also on the share of short-term capital imports
in total capital inflows. One consistent source
of information are the statistics on external in-
debtedness published by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS). According to these
data, Eastern Europe has had a relatively lower
share of short-term loans (maturity of up to one
year) since the end of 1995 as compared to Asia
or Latin America (Table 4). Until mid-1997,
this share had been on the increase. While the
Asian crises has not reduced overall lending to
the transition economies, the structure of for-
eign loans has yet changed towards relatively
more long-term loans. Interestingly, within the
Eastern European region, the Czech Republic
and Estonia have the highest share of short-term
loans in their total external bank credit. To
some extent, this is due to the greater stock of
foreign debt that Hungary and Poland (as well
as Russia) inherited from the socialist regime.17
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4.3. External Commitments
The envisaged membership in the European
Union and the concomitant participation in the
Single Market is by far the most challenging
commitment regarding capital account liberali-
zation faced by the new members. The ground
for future EU membership was laid already in
December 1991 when the Visegrad countries
signed Europe Agreements with the EU. Esto-
nia's Europe Agreement followed in mid-1995.
With regard to the capital account, the Europe
Agreements contain the following provisions.
2
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While the convertibility of the currencies for
current account transactions and for FDI in the
nonfinancial sector is ensured, capital account
transactions and FDI in banking can be more
tightly regulated. During the first phase of a
ten-year association period, the preconditions
for the full adoption of EU regulations concern-
ing the free flow of capital must be created, dur-
ing the second phase, the need for the main-
tenance of restrictions on the capital account
will be assessed. Estonia has, in contrast to the
Visegrad countries, already liberalized its capi-
tal account vis-a-vis the EU for portfolio capital
flows and for foreign bank credits. In addition
to the Europe Agreements, the EU has outlined
the prerequisites for accession to the Union in
its White Book of 1995 (EU 1995a). Future
members of the EU must accept the entire
acquis communautaire and the regulations of
the internal market. This implies, among others,
the acceptance of the principles of mutual re-
cognition of banking licenses, of minimum har-
monization, and of home country control which
are enshrined in the Second Banking Directive
of the EU of 1993. In addition, the capital ac-
count must be liberalized also for short-term
capital flows, and restrictions can be maintained
only in cases of severe external imbalances and
upon approval by the EU.
Apart from the EU regulations, the statutes of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) of the Uruguay Round deal with the
liberalization of capital flows. However, the reg-
ulations of the EU concerning the internal mar-
ket impose the most stringent requirements on
the reform countries. Articles VIII and XIV of
the IMF, for example, only deal with current
account and limited capital account convertibil-
ity.
Membership in the EU, thus, imposes the
most demanding constraints on the reform
countries. While these commitments go beyond
the degree of financial openness already ob-
tained — and may, thus, potentially increase the
exposure to adverse external shocks — it is in-
teresting to note that the conditions of EU mem-
bership by themselves reduce the potential of
foreign exchange crises. Two factors are re-
sponsible for this:
First, membership in the EU implies the
adoption of a common institutional framework
and the participation in the Single Market. This
reduces uncertainty of foreign investors con-
cerning the future economic development in the
new member countries. Reduced uncertainty, in
turn, tends to bias capital inflows towards rela-
tively longer-term inflows such as FDI and,
thus, reduces the risk of a sudden reversal of
capital flows. Taking over the institutional
framework of the EU can also have a positive
impact on macroeconomic stability. If the new
members took the stability standards of the EU
as a benchmark for their own monetary and
fiscal policies, the risk of a balance of payments
crisis triggered by inconsistent domestic pol-
icies would be reduced.
Second, allowing for the market entry of for-
eign banks and adopting the regulatory frame-18
work of the EU for the banking sector and for
financial markets potentially improves the qual-
ity of investment of foreign capital. Capital in-
flows are put to more productive uses, and this
enhances the potential to service foreign obliga-
tions in the long run. The efficiency and the
stability of the domestic banking system are of
key importance for the sustainability, of inte-
grating into international capital markets. Be-
cause foreign capital flows are often, directly or
indirectly, intermediated by domestic banks, ne-
gative feedback effects between banking and
balance of payments crises can arise (Buch and
Heinrich 1997). This holds in particular because
in many reform countries privatization of the
large state-owned banks proceeds only gradual-
ly, because nonperforming loans remain above
values observed in developed market econ-
omies, and because banking supervision is often
swamped with its new tasks. In this environ-
ment, the market entry of foreign banks and the
adoption of international banking standards can
help to improve the quality of banking.
5. Outlook
Nonequity flows of foreign capital tend to be
more volatile than flows of foreign direct in-
vestment. This, together with the relatively large
dependence of some transition economies on
foreign capital, raises the issue whether and
how nonequity capital inflows from abroad
should be regulated. Essentially, the case for a
transactions tax on short-term capital inflows is
based on the notion that financial markets react
faster than goods markets. This market imper-
fection may cause fluctuations in the real econ-
omy which are not linked to fundamentals and,
hence, a corrective tax may enhance welfare.
The main upshot of our analysis is that the in-
troduction of restrictions on short-term capital
flows can be welfare-enhancing only under
special conditions. Policymakers must, thus,
also take the following aspects into account.
First, taxes on capital flows cannot substitute
for structural reforms. Recent evidence from the
currency crises in Asia has shown the im-
portance of structural deficiencies (corporate
governance issues featuring prominently) for
balance of payments problems.
2
4 Taxes on short-
term capital flows do not solve the problem of
the induced exchange rate misalignment but
may rather delay adjustment efforts. Proponents
of a tax would object that it is precisely this ad-
ditional breathing time that governments gain
which makes the tax attractive. Yet, this win-
dow of opportunity may fail to deliver what it
promises. Externally, the imposition of restric-
tions on the capital account may send a nega-
tive signal to foreign investors that the author-
ities are unable to solve the structural problems
they are facing. This loss in confidence may
cause a retreat of foreign capital over and above
the amount originally intended. Internally, op-
ponents to reforms may gain ground if the ex-
ternal environment fails to signal inconsistent
policies, thus preventing efficient use of the ad-
ditional time.
Second, the actual design and enforcement of
the tax is an open issue. In order to be effective,
the tax should apply to residents and nonresi-
dents alike. Recent evidence of the Czech Re-
public has shown that domestic residents are at
least as sensitive to deteriorating news as for-
eigners are. Restrictions on capital inflows
would, thus, not suffice to reduce the volatility
of capital flows. In addition, there is no clear-
cut evidence as to which type of capital flows
are the most volatile and how volatility changes
after the imposition of controls.
Third, the capacity and ability to enforce the
tax is crucial. If current account and capital ac-
count transactions have been liberalized in
general, agents would be willing to pay any
amount up to the level of the tax in order to
avoid the tax. While this adjustment mechanism
does not completely erode the effectiveness of
the tax, it still reduces its impact. The Chilean
experience has revealed that isolated restric-
tions on individual capital account items are not19
effective in the medium run. Although the need
to adjust did not arise instantaneously, coverage
of capital account restrictions had to be ex-
panded over time in order to prevent evasion.
Notice, however, that the general notion that
capital account restrictions can hardly be effec-
tive is not unequivocally supported by the
Chilean evidence as the reserve requirement
seems to have served to reduce inflows of short-
term capital. Eventually, this has induced pol-
icymakers to lower the rate of reserves.
Fourth, even though a transactions tax may
be effective in reducing inflows of (short-term)
capital, it is not clear both from a theoretical
and from an empirical point of view that the tax
reduces volatility in financial markets. On a
more formal level, we have argued that the in-
troduction of a tax on capital inflows by itself
can lead to an overshooting of the exchange
rate because it is conceptually identical to a ne-
gative shock to the domestic interest rate. This
is what may have occurred in Chile in 1992 and
1993. If, as is the case for the transition econ-
omies upon membership in the EU, the tax had
to be abolished again in the future, this adjust-
ment would take place even twice. A similar
reasoning applies to transactions taxes, being
used as short-term emergency measures.
2
5 Un-
fortunately, there is hardly any evidence on the
effectiveness of transactions taxes in the foreign
exchange market with respect to the reduction
of volatility. In particular, real exchange rate
volatility in the advanced transition economies
does not appear to have risen more strongly
during the recent Asian crises than in Chile.
Fifth, the envisaged membership in the
European Union as well as membership in the
OECD restrains the choices of the transition
economies under review. Incidentally, the con-
ditions of EU membership by themselves can
reduce the exposure of the new members to ad-
verse external shocks by enhancing macroeco-
nomic stability and by strengthening institu-
tions.
While these issues make us skeptical with re-
gard to the usefulness and effectiveness of taxes
on (short-term) capital flows, there are yet a
few policy lessons that the transition economies
can take from the preceding discussion.
First, structural reforms at the domestic level
can reduce the exposure of emerging market
economies to volatile capital flows. Recent evi-
dence suggests that changes in the composition
of capital inflows away from long-term FDI
towards short-term flows in the Asian econ-
omies have been promoted by sterilization pol-
icies which held domestic interest rates at high
levels (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). In ad-
dition, there is ample evidence that sticking to
fixed exchange rate regimes which are incon-
sistent with domestic fundamentals increases
the risk of a crisis. This risk is particularly pro-
nounced if weak macroeconomic fundamentals
coincide with weak institutions and incentive
systems on a microlevel.
Second, perhaps the most important policy
implication apart from the need for sound struc-
tural reforms is the crucial need to disseminate
transparent, timely, and reliable information to
the international investment community. Better
information policies would substantially reduce
the costs of obtaining information for market
participants. Although this would not eliminate
the presence of noise traders, improved avail-
ability of information is likely to increase the
importance of fundamentalists in the market.
Finally, because commercial banks are the
key link between domestic and international fi-
nancial markets, they probably also face the
greatest exposure to foreign exchange risks.
Hence, safeguards against excessive foreign
borrowing of banks should be the focus of pol-
icymakers. Incidentally, a regulatory framework
which takes foreign exchange risks into account
is already given by the core principles for ef-
fective banking supervision of the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements and need not be de-
signed anew for the reform countries. The tran-
sition economies should take into account, how-
ever, that these general guidelines have mainly
been drafted with an eye on banks from devel-
oped market economies. Hence, it may be ne-
cessary to adjust the standards to the specific
needs of the reform countries.20
Appendix
In this appendix we derive the slopes of the loci
of stationarity, PP and FF, depicted in Figure 1
and provide a formal analysis of the impact of a
transactions tax on the dynamic adjustment path
ST of the system as well as on the steady-state
exchange rate and price level.
The system of ordinary differential equa-
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Equation [A.3] highlights that the slope of the
line of stationarity of the exchange rate critical-
ly depends on the magnitude of the transactions
tax: an increase of the tax rate implies that the
FF line becomes steeper.
In Figure 1 it is assumed that the slope of the
FF line exceeds the slope of the PP schedule.
This assumption implies that the determinant of
the coefficients matrix <p8w-
x[a(\-w){\-T)-X-
1]
of the system given in equation [A.I] exhibits a
negative sign and the model is saddlepath-
stable. The slope of the saddlepath can be
computed as the negative root of the following
characteristic quadratic equation
[A.4] f(e) = ax2e
2+(an-a22)e-a2l,
where the ay denote the corresponding ele-
ments of the coefficients matrix of the system.
Equation [A.4] reveals that the slope of the
stable trajectory of the system depends on the
coefficient a22 and is, thus, altered by a change
of the tax rate. The impact of the transactions
tax on the slope of the line ST can be identified
by setting G equal to the slope of the stable
trajectory and differentiating equation [A.4]:
[A.5] jL£- + f- = O
d da22 a22
We know that df I da22 > 0. Moreover, it follows
directly from the negative slope of the stable
trajectory and from the strict convexity of the
characteristic quadratic equation in 6 that
df/d8<0 if 6 is equal to the slope of ST. For
equation [9] to hold, it must therefore be true
that d9/da22>0. Since da22/dr>0, it follows
that the increase of the tax rate raises the slope
of the stable trajectory.
Finally, it is important to take into account
that the implementation of a transactions tax on
capital inflows induces a shift of the FF sched-
ule and, thus, entails a change of the steady-





1 We use the term currency crises in a broad sense as characterizing periods of increased exchange rate volatility, large
devaluations, and losses of foreign exchange reserves.
2 See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998: 447).
3 BIS (1998b: 187), Chote (1998: 29), and The Economist (14.3.1998) summarize the discussions. Controls on short-term
capital inflows have recently been imposed in Brazil (Financial Times, 27.3.1998).
4 The following quote has been taken from RFE-RL Newsline (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/04/210498.html):
Balcerowicz says that while he strongly supports liberal and open global trade in goods [...] he is willing to consider
measures to have some controls available on the flow of short-term capital. [...] Balcerowicz says the "size and speed"
of the movement of this kind of money has become unbelievable in the growing global market place, a new problem for
which he said he is open to "new ideas."
•> The German parliament has, for example, recently discussed a Tobin tax proposal. Although the proposal was eventual-
ly rejected, most opposition parties have in principal been sympathetic to the idea.
6 According to Garber and Taylor (1995: 173), the tax has also been proposed as a means to deal with exchange rate mis-
alignment by inducing speculators to focus on long-run fundamentals.
^ The following classification largely draws on Frankel (1996).
8 The purpose of the tax is also to expand the autonomy of national monetary policy (Eichengreen et al. 1995: 165; Tobin
1998).
" Our approach is, thus, not identical to the Tobin proposal which would require a tax on in- and outflows of capital. But
it is compatible with restrictions on capital inflows that can be expressed as a tax equivalent.
" This result is derived in more detail in the Appendix.
1 * In the Appendix it is shown that the long-run effect of the implementation of a tax on capital flows depends upon the
interest elasticity of money demand A. During the transformation process, however, money demand might undergo quite
substantial structural breaks, which might deem it impossible to obtain reliable estimates of the interest elasticity. While
first empirical evidence suggests that this problem becomes less pressing as the transition process unfolds (Buch 1998a,
1998b), it has certainly to be taken into account at the early stages of reforms. Hence, uncertainty about the structure of
money demand would complicate a prediction of the magnitude of the long-run effects of the tax.
A discussion of the implications of a transactions tax for derivatives markets can be found in Konig (1997).
3 The problem which arises in this context has also been analyzed in the theory of international trade under imperfect
competition (Helpman and Krugman 1990).
* The latter argument, however, does not necessarily apply if economic agents believe that a current abolition of capital
controls will be reversed in the future. Wijnbergen (1985) stresses that even in the aftermath of a trade liberalization un-
certainty regarding a future reversal of economic policy and, thus, uncertainty regarding the future rate of return of in-
vestment implies that investors will postpone irreversible international investments in physical capital.
5 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) survey various models of irreversible investment under uncertainty.
1
6 See, for example, Episcopos (1995) and Leahy and Whited (1996) for the United States, Goodson (1995) for New
Zealand, and Seppelfricke (1996) and Mailand (1997) for Germany.
1' The following information has been taken from Laban and Larrain (1998), Ffrench-Davis et al. (1995), and IMF
(1998b).
1
8 These data were calculated from Laban et al. (1997: Table 1).
For a comprehensive survey of convertibility issues in transition economies see Backe (1996).
2" In addition, the government used moral suasion to induce the large — and partly state-owned — banks not to speculate
against the Czech koruna.
2' Through December 1996, this widening of the band reduced the volatility of the nominal exchange rate (Kocenda 1998).
2
2 This is also true for Argentina or Mexico for that matter.
2
3 See EU (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995b), and Kuschel (1992).
See Diehl and Schweickert (1998) for an in-depth analysis of the Asian currency crises.
2
5 Guitidn (1998: 17), for example, suggests capital controls not as a "standard weapon in a country's policy arsenal," but
as transitory instruments, ideally being used under the supervision of an international organization.
The log of the domestic money stock, the foreign interest rate and the log of natural output are fixed at zero. Note that
one could allow the weights w to depend directly on the tax rate. Such a specification, however, would complicate the
comparative statics of our analysis. Since we are interested to keep the algebra involved in the derivation of our main
results as simple as possible, we decide to employ the adjustment scheme given in equation [5] (Box 1).22
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